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Regulation by Liability Insurance:  
From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability
Tom Baker 
Rick Swedloff
AbstRAct
Liability insurers use a variety of tools to address adverse selection and moral hazard in 
insurance relationships.  These tools can act on insureds in a manner that can be understood 
as regulation.  We identify seven categories of such regulatory activities: risk-based pricing, 
underwriting, contract design, claims management, loss prevention services, research and 
education, and engagement with public regulators.  We describe these activities in general 
terms and then draw upon prior literature to explore them in the context of five areas of 
liability and corresponding insurance: shareholder liability, automobile liability, gun liability, 
medical professional liability, and lawyers professional liability.  The goal is to develop a 
conceptual framework to guide qualitative research on liability insurance as governance for 
initial application to lawyers’ liability and insurance.
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INTRODUCTION 
It is a privilege to participate in a symposium that honors the career and 
contributions of Professor Stephen Yeazell.  As Professor Yeazell’s work has 
emphasized, civil procedure is not an end in itself and litigation is not merely a 
way to channel dispute resolution.  Civil procedure and litigation matter because 
this country “relies on civil lawsuits rather than regulatory or social welfare 
regimes . . . [to] assign responsibility and pay compensation in a wide variety of 
circumstances.”1  That is, litigation matters, in part, because liability regulates the 
behavior of potential wrongdoers.  In this Article, we endeavor to understand 
more about the regulatory power of litigation through the lens of liability 
insurance. 
As Professor Yeazell and others have observed, liability insurance has a 
profound impact on all phases of the litigation process, including determining 
which parties get sued, the types of claims and defenses raised, and the settlement 
of suit.2  First, liability insurance affects who litigates against whom, for what, and 
for how much.3  As Professor Yeazell says, “[n]o one working on a contingent fee 
intentionally sues an insolvent defendant,”4 and “[l]iability insurance directly 
produces a solvent prospective defendant and, given liability and injury, obviously 
increases prospective recovery.”5  But the influence of insurance on litigation does 
not end there; the presence of insurance also influences claims, defenses, and set- 
  
1. Stephen Yeazell, Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Lawsuits?, in CONFIDENTIALITY, 
TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 143, 144 (Joseph W. Doherty et al. eds., 2012). 
2. Cf. Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 186 (2001) (noting first 
that litigation is driven in no small part by “social and economic developments outside law and, within 
law, in the business and financial structure of practice” and arguing further that “even when legal rules 
have changed, the interaction of the changes with the business and financial structure, rather than the 
substantive changes themselves, has produced the most dramatic results”).  See generally KENNETH S. 
ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE 
ERA TO 9/11 (2008) (describing the inextricable relationship between tort and insurance). 
3. See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort 
Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2005). 
4. Yeazell, supra note 2, at 186. 
5. Id. at 189; see also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared 
to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) (“[A]lmost all defendants, except some large businesses 
and most government entities, have insurance that covers the cost of defending the lawsuit and all or 
some of the potential damages.”); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of 
Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 361 (1991) (“[T]he 
typical liability insurance contract gives complete control over settlement to the insurance company, 
which must take both trial costs and potential judgments into account in evaluating settlements.”); cf. 
Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1629, 1632 (1994) 
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tlement.  For example, plaintiffs may attempt to shape claims to fall under 
potential insurance coverage.6  Further, liability insurance contracts typically give 
the insurer the right to defend any covered claim and the discretion to settle the 
claim or not, without the consent of the nominal defendant.7  This is hardly 
surprising, since it is the insurer’s money at stake.  But the insurers’ right to 
control the litigation means that, even when a plaintiff is nominally suing an 
individual defendant, the plaintiff’s real adversary is a massively repeat player, 
with all the consequences that entails for litigation and legal developments.8 
Our focus, however, is at a step antecedent to litigation.  Once insurers 
accept the financial responsibility for civil liability, they not only have an incentive 
to manage the defense and settlement of liability claims, but they also have an 
incentive to reduce the likelihood that those claims arise in the first place.  This 
should make sense.  Just as the fear of liability is supposed to incentivize potential 
wrongdoers to take appropriate precautions, fear of liability should incentivize an 
insurer to encourage its insured to take precautions.9  Once an insurer un-
derwrites a risk, the insurer has every reason to try to reduce its payouts by 
encouraging insureds to prevent the potential loss from materializing.  That can, 
and sometimes does, lead insurers to attempt to regulate loss-producing activities. 
We are in the early stages of qualitative research exploring this regulatory 
role in the context of lawyers professional liability (LPL) insurance.  Lawyers’ 
incentives and the organizations in which they work affect how they practice, 
including whom they choose to represent, the kinds of services they provide, and 
how they provide those services to their clients.10  Some prior literature asserts 
  
(“[I]nsurers and attorneys, with the cooperation and encouragement of legal and political institutions, 
have successfully, though perhaps unwittingly, driven us to overconsume liability insurance.”). 
6. Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 1721, 1721–22 (1997) (providing examples of plaintiffs framing claims as negligent 
actions instead of intentional ones to avoid insurance exclusions). 
7. See generally ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE 
LAW 875 (4th ed. 2007) (reporting that insurer has right to defend and discretion to settle without 
consent of insured).  Liability insurance policies sold to large organizations are the exception.  
8. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (arguing that repeat players in litigation, like insurance 
companies, and individuals or companies, who are likely only one-time parties to litigation, have 
different incentives to litigate specific arguments and describing the significance this has on the 
development of the law). 
9. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral 
Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 210–12 (2012); cf. RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE 
AS GOVERNANCE (2003) (taking a sociological perspective that would be critical of the present 
functionalist account). 
10. See infra Section III.A for a discussion on how various incentives change lawyers’ behaviors. 
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that insurers can play an important role in shaping these incentives and organiza-
tions, but there has been no systematic empirical investigation of such regulation.11   
We use the opportunity provided by this Symposium to lay a conceptual 
foundation for our empirical research.  In Part I, we first describe the main ac-
tivities through which liability insurers might be said to regulate the people and 
organizations that they insure.  In Part II, we then explore those activities in the 
context of four fields of liability and insurance: (A) shareholder liability, (B) auto 
liability, (C) gun liability, and (D) medical malpractice.  Finally, in Part III, we 
turn to LPL insurance, drawing on the prior literature to suggest some ways that 
liability insurers may regulate law practice and to develop questions to be in-
vestigated in the ongoing research. 
I. REGULATORY ACTIVITIES OF LIABILITY INSURERS 
Liability insurance has proven to be central to nearly every field of liability 
that has been the subject of even casual empirical analysis, including automobile 
liability,12 workplace liability,13 environmental liability,14 corporate and securities 
  
11. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 96 GEO. L.J. 1909 
(2006) (arguing that risk management techniques designed to avoid liability undermine individual ethical 
decisionmaking); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General 
Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2002) (describing 
the results of a series of interviews about the regulatory impact of the increasing prevalence of general 
counsels and other compliance specialists at law firms); George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance 
and Loss Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305 (1997) (laying 
out the economic framework under which liability insurance could regulate lawyers); Anthony E. Davis, 
Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of Lawyer Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 95 (2008) [hereinafter Davis, Complementary Visions] (arguing that insurance risk management 
devices can enhance ethical decisionmaking); Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as 
Regulators of Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209 (1996) [hereinafter Davis, Regulators] (providing 
an on-the-ground account of the ways that insurers attempt to regulate legal practice); James M. Fischer, 
External Control Over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59, 63–64, 64 n.23 (2006) (arguing 
that lawyers are increasingly subject to regulation by external sources, including insurance); Milton C. 
Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957 (2006) (responding to Alfieri’s concerns about the 
governance implications of risk management); Charles Silver, Professional Liability Insurance as Insurance 
and as Lawyer Regulation: Response to Davis, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 233 (1996) (providing a theoretical 
grounding and response to Davis, Regulators, supra). 
12. See, e.g., H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF 
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (rev. ed. 1980). 
13. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 39; Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance, and the Social Construction of 
Responsibility, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 33, 42–43 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002). 
14. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF TOXIC TORT AND HAZARDOUS WASTE INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES 
(1991); Haitao Yin et al., Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private Insurance 
Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 325 (2011). 
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liability,15 medical liability,16 products liability,17 and media liability.18  There are 
exceptions to be sure, such as patent infringement19 and contract litigation,20 but 
liability insurance stands behind such a large, if not precisely determinable, 
proportion of civil liability in the United States that liability insurance data are 
used to estimate the size and reach of the U.S. civil justice system.21  Appreciation 
of the important link between liability and liability insurance was slow in coming, 
and certain aspects of that link remain controversial.22  Nevertheless, the chal-
lenge today lies less in measuring the overall strength of the link than in charting 
how liability insurance affects insured behavior, litigation, and substantive lia-
bility across different fields. 
We begin here with a simple law and economics framework for analyzing 
and comparing regulation by liability insurance.  In that framework, tort liability 
exists for a single purpose: deterrence.  Tort liability (or the threat of liability) 
forces potential tortfeasors to internalize the costs of the harm they cause through 
their bad acts.23  This, in turn, encourages efficient levels of loss prevention.24  
Liability insurance might be seen to frustrate that purpose because coverage 
  
15. See, e.g., TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW 
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010). 
16. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 104–38; Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance 
Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2005). 
17. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 139–70; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 9. 
18. See, e.g., Elizabeth O. Hubbart, When Worlds Collide: The Intersection of Insurance and Motion 
Pictures, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 267 (1997); Thomas Plotkin & Tarae Howell, “Fair is Foul and Foul is 
Fair:” Have Insurers Loosened the Chokepoint of Copyright and Permitted Fair Use’s Breathing Space in 
Documentary Films?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 407 (2009). 
19. See, e.g., CJA CONSULTANTS LTD., PATENT LITIGATION INSURANCE: A STUDY FOR THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE FEASIBILITY OF POSSIBLE INSURANCE SCHEMES 
AGAINST PATENT LITIGATION RISKS (2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
indprop/docs/patent/studies/pli_report_en.pdf. 
20. Many tort cases can also be brought as contract cases and are covered by the applicable liability 
insurance either way.  Products liability cases can also be brought as breach of the implied waiver of 
merchantability, and professional liability cases can also be brought as breach of contract cases. 
21. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: 
Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75 (1993) (using 
insurance data as a way to measure, for example, the extent of injuries); Tom Baker, Transparency 
Through Insurance: Mandates Dominate Discretion, in CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND 
THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 187, 188–89. 
22. See Jane Stapleton, Tort, Insurance and Ideology, 58 MOD. L. REV. 820 (1995); Gerhard Wagner, Tort 
Liability and Insurance: Comparative Report and Final Conclusions, 16 TORT & INS. L. 309 (2005). 
23. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 189 (6th ed. 2012). 
24. See generally Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120 (1982).  For a 
review of the literature, see Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, The Law and Economics of Liability 
Insurance: A Theoretical and Empirical Review, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS 
OF TORTS (Jennifer Arlen ed., forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1783793. 
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insulates bad actors from liability.  Indeed, there is evidence that insurance does 
change incentives—does create a moral hazard—in relation to at least some kinds 
of liability.25  But, at least in theory, liability insurance institutions have the ca-
pacity to manage that moral hazard.26  If so, “the success of insurers in managing 
insurance incentives may well mean that the most important ‘moral hazard’ effect 
is not increased loss, but rather increased social control” by insurers.27 
Accordingly, one important strand of empirical research on insurance 
investigates how insurers manage the moral hazard of insurance, and hence how 
they control or regulate their insureds.28  The research identifies five main tools 
that almost all insurers use to one degree or another: risk-based pricing, un-
derwriting, insurance contract design, claims management, and, less frequently, 
loss prevention services.  In addition, some insurers and their trade associations 
also engage in research and education and, sometimes, even lobby for public 
safety regulation.29 
In our characterization of all of these activities as moral hazard management 
tools, we do not contend that insurers engage in these activities exclusively for the 
purpose of managing moral hazard.  Nor do we contend that the concept of moral 
hazard management provides an adequate description of the meaning of these 
activities in the liability insurance field.  Individuals and organizations do things 
for all kinds of reasons and, once employed for a particular purpose, an activity 
will have different effects and even different purposes across time and place.  In 
this Article, and at this early stage in our research, we are using the concept of 
moral hazard management as a narrative device, part of an admittedly thin 
conceptual framework that allows easy comparison across subfields of liability 
insurance.  One of the goals of our ongoing empirical research on lawyers profes-
  
25. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 15, at 72–79 (concluding that, as presently structured, 
directors and officers insurance imposes agency costs on publicly traded corporations). 
26. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 9; Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. 
ECON. 541 (1979). 
27. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 282 (1996). 
28. See, e.g., CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL 
HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1985). 
29. Our description of these moral hazard management activities as a form of regulation builds on a 
recent article by Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle Logue, Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 9, which 
generalized and improved a conceptual approach developed by Tom Baker and Thomas O. Farrish 
in the context of their research on liability insurance and the regulation of firearms.  Tom Baker & 
Thomas O. Farrish, Liability Insurance & the Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN 
INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 292 
(Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2008). 
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sional liability is to thicken our understanding through interviews and obser-
vation.30 
A. Risk-Based Pricing 
Except when prohibited from doing so,31 insurers operating in a competitive 
market attempt to set prices based on the risks insured.  Their reasons for doing 
so are straightforward.  Insurance is a bet about the probability of an event oc-
curring.  Riskier bets have a higher probability of requiring the insurer to pay.  A 
higher premium for these higher risks allows the insurer to cover the anticipated 
additional payouts.  An insurer that can better distinguish which applicants are 
more likely to suffer a loss improves its competitive position by lowering its own 
average risk of paying out (or improves its cover) and, potentially, raises the 
average risk of the competition.32 
Risk-based pricing provides an incentive for people to do what they can to 
reduce exposure to liability claims to avoid higher insurance prices in the future.  
This is moral hazard mitigation, plain and simple.  Risk-based pricing also can 
make people aware of loss prevention measures and incentivize corresponding 
changes to behavior.  Insurance prices are highly credible loss prevention signals, 
because insurers have an incentive to get those signals right and a feedback 
mechanism—insurance claims—to assess how they are doing in that regard.  
People who are motivated to avoid liability claims might actually take more care if 
they have access to insurance than if they do not, because loss prevention–based 
discounts can educate them about, or make more salient, ways to take care.  This 
risk-communication aspect of insurance pricing leads directly to the next moral 
hazard management tool: underwriting. 
  
30. Cf. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS BY CLIFFORD GEERTZ 3 (1973).  For a re-
cent example of thick explanation in the financial services context, see ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL 
KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011). 
31. For example, insurers may be prohibited from using race or gender as a proxy for riskiness in 
particular markets.  See generally Ronen Avraham et al., The Anatomy of Insurance Anti-discrimination 
Laws (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 289, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2135800. 
32. Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 371, 377 (2003). 
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B. Underwriting 
Insurance underwriting is the process of evaluating which risks to insure and 
at what price.33  We discuss underwriting separately from pricing to emphasize 
that insurers can collect and provide loss prevention information that may not be 
reflected in price differentials.  Insurers do this to assess whether to provide in-
surance at all or to encourage loss prevention behavior that insurers believe to be 
beneficial even though they do not offer premium discounts.34  (For example, it 
may be too costly to monitor whether the insured complies with the loss pre-
vention advice, or the insurer may not have sufficient information to calculate the 
value of the loss prevention.)  Whether purchasers act on that information is up 
to them, but someone who is motivated to avoid liability claims, or the mistakes 
or injuries that lead to claims, will take credible loss prevention advice from wher-
ever it comes. 
C. Contract Design 
Insurers use contract design to mitigate moral hazard in several ways.  They 
use contract provisions like limits, deductibles, and coinsurance so that the insur-
ance does not fully insulate people from their losses, keeping their skin in the 
game.35  Limits keep insureds’ skin in the game at the high end, deductibles at 
the low end, and coinsurance throughout.  Insurers also use contract provisions 
that eliminate or reduce coverage for claims thought to pose a high degree of 
moral hazard.  For example, most general liability insurance policies exclude from 
coverage harms that are expected or intended by the insured.36  In addition, 
insurers in the large commercial market also use targeted exclusions—sometimes 
called laser exclusions—to exclude particular kinds of claims from coverage, 
thereby placing a cap on the total amount of coverage for that particular claim for 
that particular insured.37  These contract designs regulate indirectly.  By leaving a 
greater share of certain liability risks on the insured, they encourage greater 
vigilance over those risks. 
  
33. SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 
141 (2d ed. 2004) (“[T]he overall process of assessing the expected claims costs for buyers, de-
termining the applicable rate, and deciding whether to offer coverage is known as underwriting.”). 
34. See, e.g., BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 15, at 79–80 (on selection); id. at 112 (on good loss 
prevention practices that do not produce measurable differences in outcomes). 
35. See, e.g., id. at 220. 
36. See Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 739 (2012). 
37. See Baker & Farrish, supra note 29, at 296–97. 
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D. Claims Management 
The contract provisions described above manage moral hazard by selectively 
limiting the extent of insurance.  Insurers also can use contract provisions to give 
them control over claims management.  In the liability insurance context, these 
provisions may give insurers control over the defense and the settlement of the 
underlying insured claims.38  Insurer control over claims management mitigates 
ex post moral hazard (a policyholder’s lack of concern over the cost of a claim 
once it occurs).39  Consumer and small business liability policies generally give 
insurers exclusive control over the defense and the settlement of claims.40  Com-
mercial policies sold to larger entities often allow the entities to control their own 
defense, but the insurer has a voice in that defense and significant control over 
settlement.41  Insurers’ claims management directly regulates the litigation 
process, but it also promotes other aspects of regulation through insurance by 
providing an opportunity for insurers to learn about liability risks, both in general 
and in relation to the particular insured.  Insurers can use this information in 
pricing, underwriting, and loss prevention services, the next moral hazard 
management tool.42 
E. Loss Prevention Services 
Given the massive amount of data they are able to collect on claims and 
harms, insurers may have an advantage over their insureds in identifying the best 
ways to reduce risk of loss.43  Insurers may be able to educate their insureds about 
what they have gleaned from the data and the root causes of different types of 
loss.  These loss prevention services may be the easiest aspect of the insurance 
  
38. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 875. 
39. Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Defense Lawyers: From Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 4 
CONN. INS. L.J. 101, 107–08 (1997). 
40. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE (TENT DRAFT NO. 1) § 
12, cmt. a (“Traditionally, personal liability insurance policies, such as the liability insurance 
coverage parts of homeowners and automobile liability insurance policies, and many commercial 
liability insurance policies assign to the insurer the right and duty to defend any potentially covered 
claim.”); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 866 (“The typical language reserves to the insurer 
the privilege to settle, or not to settle, as the insurer in the exercise of its discretion sees fit.”). 
41. See, e.g., BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 15, at 129–30 (describing the allocation of defense and 
settlement authority under public company directors and officers liability insurance policies). 
42. Cf. Margo Schlanger, Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Management (In Hospitals, a Large 
Retailer, and Jails and Prisons), 2 J. TORT L., no. 1, 2008; Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for 
Medical Malpractice Reform, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 50–51) (on file 
with author). 
43. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 9, at 210. 
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business to understand as a form of regulation, because the insurers are advising 
clients on how to modify behavior to avoid losses. 
Other industries likewise provide their clients with advice about minimizing 
losses.  For example, accountants may advise their clients about the best ways to 
shelter assets from taxation and lawyers may advise clients about how to avoid 
liability.  Insurers likewise should be, and sometimes are, highly sought after 
sources of loss prevention services.44  But unlike other sources of loss prevention 
services, insurers bond their advice.  If a loss occurs, they pay, whether their advice 
was good, bad, or indifferent.45  The same cannot be said of accountants, consul-
tants, lawyers, or other purveyors of loss prevention services.  Making these other 
service providers pay requires proving negligence and a causal link between that 
negligence and the loss.  But making the insurer pay requires only proving the 
loss (and sometimes that the loss is covered by the policy).46  This suggests that 
insurers have an extra incentive to reach out to insureds to provide these services 
and should be credible providers of those services.  
Although insurers provide loss prevention services for other reasons as well 
(such as marketing, public relations, and buyer demand), there is at least some 
moral hazard management involved.  Insurers can use the information gained 
from the loss prevention activity to finetune their underwriting and perhaps even 
their pricing.  Moreover, active engagement in loss prevention may identify an 
insured as posing lower-than-average moral hazard, possibly allowing the insurer 
to offer a better price, better contract terms, or more autonomy in the claims 
process. 
F. Research and Education 
All of the activities discussed so far hold out the possibility of reasonably 
identifiable payoffs to the contracting parties: lower prices or better terms for pur-
chasers and lower or more predictable claim costs for insurers.  Insurers also en-
gage in loss prevention research and education that appears to have more of a 
public good character; some benefits extend beyond the specific insurer or its 
policyholders.47  As Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle Logue describe, this research 
  
44. Cohen, supra note 11, at 332–45. 
45. Id. at 343. 
46. But cf. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 
85, 103 (2001) (discussing the implied “big claim exclusion” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
47. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 9, at 212. 
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and education can lead to regulatory techniques such as private safety codes, loss-
control toolkits, and safety coaching.48 
Presumably, insurers believe that such activities offer them private benefits, 
such as brand recognition, customer loyalty, or preferential treatment from their 
regulators.  Or perhaps these activities identify them at the cutting edge of loss 
prevention, attracting loss prevention–minded customers who are low risk (which 
may lead to propitious selection).49  Whatever the motivation, loss prevention 
research and education may help to offset the aggregate moral hazard impact of 
liability insurance by reducing the frequency or severity of liability claims.  In 
addition, the research may inform insurers’ pricing, underwriting, and claims 
management efforts. This allows insurers to target specific insureds. 
G. Engagement With Public Regulation 
This final moral hazard management tool is a logical extension of loss 
prevention research and education.  Sometimes a loss prevention measure may 
make so much sense to insurance industry leaders that they are motivated to 
engage with public regulators.  This engagement may increase the likelihood that 
insureds will undertake these measures or serve to recruit the government into 
overseeing enforcement.  There are many examples in the automobile context, 
some of which seem likely to affect auto liability claims (such as airbag and 
seatbelt regulation).50  Like research and education, engagement with public 
regulation does not directly affect the moral hazard of any particular insurance 
contract, but it may have aggregate loss prevention benefits that reduce whatever 
overall moral hazard impact of liability insurance there may be. 
II. REGULATION BY LIABILITY INSURANCE IN OTHER FIELDS 
To set the stage for our ongoing research on lawyers professional liability 
insurance, we will next describe what we can discern about how insurers use these 
tools in four other liability areas: (A) shareholder liability, (B) automobile liability, 
  
48. Id. at 210–13. 
49. See David Hemenway, Propitious Selection, 105 Q.J. ECON. 1063 (1990) (applying the theory of 
propitious selection to argue that risk-adverse individuals tend to buy insurance as well as take 
added precautions).  For a review of the literature on adverse selection, see Peter Siegelman, Adverse 
Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004). 
50. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 9, at 222.  Mothers Against Drunk Driving reports that two of 
the first major financial contributors to that organization were insurance industry executives who 
had lost family members to drunk driving.  See Laurie Davies, 25 Years of Saving Lives, DRIVEN, 
Fall 2005, at 9, 11. 
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(C) gun liability, and (D) medical professional liability.  As these examples will 
show, there is wide variation in the nature and extent of regulation through lia-
bility insurance across and within fields of liability. 
A. Shareholder Liability and Insurance 
We begin with shareholder liability and insurance, not because it is the best 
comparison for lawyers liability and insurance, but rather because it is the field 
that has been the subject of the most directly analogous research project, 
conducted by Tom Baker and Sean Griffith during the 2005–2010 period.51  
There is much publicly available information about the other kinds of liability 
and insurance, but that information has not previously been collected in a manner 
that fits as well with our conceptual framework. 
Public companies and their officers and directors protect themselves from 
the financial consequences of shareholder liability through the purchase of 
Directors and Officers Liability Insurance (D&O insurance).  The research on 
D&O insurance as governance reaches decidedly mixed conclusions about how 
insurers manage the moral hazard of public company D&O insurance.  Our 
discussion here, like Baker and Griffith’s research, focuses exclusively on the 
D&O insurance sold to public companies (those with publicly traded shares).  
Risk-based pricing.  On the one hand, D&O insurers report that they work 
hard to price on the basis of risk.52  They have every incentive to do so, and there 
are no legal or other institutional restrictions on risk-based pricing that the re-
searchers could find.  On the other hand, there is substantial evidence that in-
surers are not very confident about their ability to price on risk given that the 
pricing differentials are small in relation to the insured liabilities.53  Moreover, 
insurers do not provide discounts for companies that undertake specific loss 
prevention activities.54  Thus, at best, risk-based pricing mitigates the moral 
hazard of D&O insurance by providing a modest incentive for avoiding claims. 
Underwriting and ex ante loss prevention services.  The D&O insurance 
underwriting process does not provide significant, useful loss prevention infor-
mation to public companies.55  D&O insurance companies do not condition the 
provision of insurance on the basis of any loss prevention commitments by public 
  
51. See generally BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 15. 
52. Id. at 79. 
53. Id. at 78 (“[A]lthough D&O insurers do seek to price on the basis of risk, their efforts are unlikely 
to be sufficient to reinvigorate the deterrence function of shareholder litigation.”); see also id. at 203. 
54. Id. at 112. 
55. Id. at 105. 
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companies or their officers and directors, nor do D&O insurers provide 
significant loss prevention services.56  For the fully nuanced explanation, there is 
no shortcut to reading the research, but here is the punch line: 
[W]e find the agency-cost explanation most compelling.  Top exec-
utives buy D&O insurance, with their shareholder’s money, so that all 
but the most extraordinary securities class actions will be a “nonevent” 
in the life of a publicly traded company.  And, it would be easy to 
argue, they do not want to allow an insurer’s concern about the 
possibility of a securities class action to be an event that interferes with 
their freedom.  Thus, the absence of insurer monitoring . . . is an 
agency cost—a “perk” that managers buy to make it easier, and more 
profitable, for them to keep their jobs, at the expense of the sharehold-
ers who own the company.  Top executives in public corporations are 
thus able to purchase income-smoothing insurance without ceding any 
governance authority to insurers because this purchase, like all such 
decisions, is insulated from shareholder challenge by the business-
judgment rule.57 
Contract design.  Although D&O insurers may not exercise much gover- 
nance authority directly, D&O insurance contracts contain a variety of moral 
hazard control features.  There are substantial deductibles in the D&O coverage 
provided to the insured companies.58  These deductibles provide some incentive 
for public companies to manage the costs of defense and to resist paying nuisance 
settlements.  Perhaps more importantly, the total amount of coverage that D&O 
insurers are willing to provide is much less than the potential damages that could be 
awarded in securities class action involving egregious fraud. As a result, D&O 
insurance protects public companies from what might be thought of as ordinary 
or run-of-the-mill securities fraud but leaves them exposed to really serious 
cases.59 
  
56. Id. at 110–13.  The following story is instructive: 
[A] longtime top official in the D&O insurance industry described a time that he 
and another senior official prepared a detailed set of loss-prevention recommen-
dations for a customer in the early days of what was then their new company. . . . 
Very pleased with their work, they mailed it off to the customer.  “We got it back,” 
he reported, “almost like it was something we sent them in a brown envelope.  They 
didn’t want it.  And they didn’t want it in their files.  We learned that’s not what 
they want from us.” 
Id. at 126. 
57. Id. at 126–27. 
58. Id. at 47.  Note that the coverage provided directly to their directors and officers, which kicks in 
only if the company cannot pay, typically does not have deductibles.  Id. 
59. Id. at 20. 
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Consistent with that dynamic, D&O insurance policies contain fraud ex-
clusions that contain a “final adjudication” requirement.  Under this provision, 
claims are covered unless and until there is a final adjudication of fraud in the case 
for which coverage is sought.60  Other moral hazard control features in D&O in-
surance contracts include exclusions for claims brought by one insured against 
another (which could be collusive) and for claims based on illegal profits received 
by an insured.61 
Claims management.  D&O insurance contracts give insurers limited control 
over claims management.  D&O insurance policies are “defense cost payment” 
policies, rather than “duty to defend” policies, so that people insured by a D&O 
policy get to choose their own defense lawyer and direct their own defense.62  The 
D&O policy also gives insureds significant control over the settlement process, 
subject to the obligation to obtain the insurer’s consent.  As a result, the insurer’s 
only protections against ex post moral hazard are the right to refuse to reimburse 
unreasonable defense costs and the right to refuse to consent to an unreasonable 
settlement.63 
Research and education and engagement with public regulation.  With the 
exception of one D&O insurance company that subsequently went out of busi-
ness,64 D&O insurance companies do not engage in significant loss prevention 
research and education efforts, nor do they engage significantly with public 
regulation.  D&O insurers have newsletters and brochures that contain loss 
prevention information, but “underwriters and brokers uniformly describe this 
literature as marketing material.”65  Some insurers support organizations that 
promote good governance, such as Institutional Shareholder Services, and par-
ticipate in directors’ and officers’ training efforts, but there is nothing that 
approaches the focused loss prevention research and education efforts by the 
  
60. Id. at 186–88.  See the following quote from a D&O insurance claims manager: 
We may insure securities fraud but not real fraud. . . . If you are going to be out and 
out fraud, that is uninsurable, okay.  And that’s the paradox of the insurance.  
Everybody buys the policy for when they get hit with securities fraud allegations, 
and if it weren’t for the fact that recklessness is a standard there, we probably 
wouldn’t be able to insure it at all, because if you had to prove outright fraud in every 
case, it would be uninsurable in every case. 
Id. at 186 (alteration in original). 
61. Id. at 49. 
62. Id. at 129. 
63. Id. at 129–32.  As a practical matter, the right to refuse to consent to a settlement may provide only 
limited protection, however, because policyholders regularly settle cases when the insurer refuses to 
consent and then bring a breach of contract action against the insurer on the grounds that the 
insurer unreasonably withheld consent.  Id. at 140. 
64. Id. at 111–13. 
65. Id. at 111. 
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automobile insurance industry.66  Similarly, D&O insurers do not typically 
engage with public regulation of corporate governance or with financial disclo-
sure, for example through government relations efforts targeted at the Securities 
Exchange Commission or at Delaware law reform.67 
B. Automobile Liability and Insurance 
Automobile liability may well be the part of the liability field most com-
pletely tied up with liability insurance.68  Automobile liability insurance became 
ubiquitous by the mid-twentieth century thanks, first, to the insurance require-
ments contained in automobile finance contracts and, second, to state automobile 
financial responsibility laws.69  Absent liability insurance, most individual drivers 
and even many commercial drivers would not be worth pursuing and, thus, not as 
a practical matter subject to civil liability.70  Automobile liability has not been the 
subject of systematic qualitative research that explicitly examines regulation by 
insurance.71  But there is a substantial body of empirical research on auto liability 
and other public information from which we can make useful generalizations. 
Risk-based pricing.  By all accounts, auto insurers take a highly data-driven 
approach to auto insurance pricing.  This approach is not directed at moral 
  
66. See id.  Institutional Shareholder Services is “the leading provider of corporate governance solutions 
to the global financial community.”  INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, http://www. 
issgovernance.com/about (last visited July 2, 2013). 
67. This type of activity is so infrequent that it did not come up in the D&O insurance research effort.  
Subsequently we corresponded with the leading D&O insurance industry commentator and 
confirmed this to be the case.  See E-mail from Kevin LaCroix, Exec. Vice President, RT ProExec, 
to Tom Baker (Jan. 29, 2013) (on file with author) (“[T]here is not so far as I am aware any 
organized effort by the D&O insurance industry or individual companies within the industry to 
shape regulation or policy.”). 
68. See ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 69.  See generally Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: 
Automobile Accidents, Insurance, and the Challenge to Social Order in the Inter-war Years, 1919 to 1941, 
4 CONN. INS. L.J. 521 (1998). 
69. See Yeazell, supra note 2, at 188–89 (noting that, thanks to the insurance industry’s practice of 
bundling first party property coverage for automobiles with liability coverage, automobile financing 
made automobile liability insurance mandatory as a de facto matter for large segments of the public 
well before mandatory liability insurance laws were enacted). 
70. Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 275, 289–90 (2001); Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 603, 606 (2006) (“[M]any Americans are ‘judgment proof’: They lack sufficient assets (or 
sufficient collectible assets) to pay the judgment in full (or even in substantial part).”).  For that 
reason, it makes little sense to think about the moral hazard effect of liability insurance, except in 
terms of social control.  Of course there are large, solvent organizations with cars, just as there are 
wealthy individuals, but they do not represent the mass of automobile liability claiming.  As the 
designers of mandatory automobile liability insurance well understood, tort liability cannot function 
as a form of governance for ordinary people unless it is accompanied by liability insurance. 
71. There are partial exceptions.  See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 12; Simon, supra note 68. 
1428 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412 (2013) 
 
hazard management per se but may have some regulatory impact.72  The best 
candidates are differential pricing by auto type (e.g., sports car vs. minivans), 
accident record, the amount of miles driven in a year, auto safety features, and 
whether teen drivers have completed drivers’ education courses.  We have been 
unable to find much econometric research documenting the effects of these 
practices,73 but automobile insurance is such a salient cost of auto ownership that 
we expect that higher prices can have significant effects, for example by encour-
aging the purchase of cars that are cheaper to insure.74 
Discounts for safety features are likely to have an even larger effect on 
accidents, because safety has value for consumers well beyond any reduction in 
insurance premiums.  After all, the same activity that exposes people to a risk of 
auto liability also exposes them to injury.  Discounts for drivers’ education are 
similarly likely to pay off to an extent that goes beyond the discount’s value.  
There is significant evidence that the price of auto insurance affects the rate of 
teen drivers.75  Discounts for drivers’ education reduce the effective price and, 
presumably, provide safety benefits that parents, and maybe even some teens, 
value even apart from the reduction in price. 
Underwriting.  Because automobile insurance is sold on such a mass market, 
data-driven basis, we doubt that the underwriting process provides individuals 
with loss prevention information (except as reflected in discounts or other price 
features).  Our own experience is that generic loss prevention information (such 
  
72. See, e.g., Samuel Krikler et al., Method and Tools for Insurance Price and Revenue Optimisation, 9 J. 
FIN. SERVICES MARKETING 68 (2004); MM Segovia-Gonzalez et al., A DEA Analysis of Risk, 
Cost, and Revenues in Insurance, 60 J. OPERATIONAL RES. SOC’Y 1483 (2009); Malia Wollan, 
Data Driven, FAST COMPANY, June 2011, at 46, 48 (reporting the data-driven nature of 
Progressive Insurance Company). 
73. Cf. Georges Dionne & Benoit Dostie, Estimating the Effect of a Change in Insurance Pricing Regime 
on Accidents With Endogenous Mobility, 2007 INSTITUT D’ÉCONOMIE APPLIQUÉE 1 (showing 
that the introduction of a bonus-malus reduces accident rates); Sharon Tennyson, Incentive Effects 
of Community Rating in Insurance Markets: Evidence From Massachusetts Automobile Insurance, 35 
GENEVA RISK & INS. REV. 19 (2010); Mary A. Weiss et al., The Effects of Regulated Premium 
Subsidies on Insurance Costs: An Empirical Analysis of Automobile Insurance, 77 J. RISK & INS. 597 
(2010) (showing that rate suppression increases accident rates). 
74. See, e.g., Frederick P. Rivara et al., Dad, May I Have the Keys? Factors Influencing Which Vehicles 
Teenagers Drive, PEDIATRICS, Nov. 1998, at 57, 58, available at http://pediatrics.aappublications. 
org/content/102/5/e57.full.html (listing insurance costs as an important factor); Jenny Zhan & 
Brenda Vrkljan, Exploring Factors That Influence Vehicle Purchase Decisions of Older Drivers: Where 
Does Safety Fit?, 2011 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH INT’L DRIVING SYMP. ON HUM. 
FACTORS IN DRIVING ASSESSMENT, TRAINING & VEHICLE DESIGN 102, 107 (“Partici-
pants . . . accounted for long term costs of vehicles in their vehicle selection, including insurance 
and fuel.”). 
75. See, e.g., Rose Anne Devlin, Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Analysis of 
the Experience in Quebec, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE ECONOMICS 499 (Georges 
Dionne ed., 1992). 
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as tips for child safety seats or managing teenage drivers) comes in the mail only 
after we had already been approved for and purchased the policy.  But whether 
underwriting provides any real information about loss prevention to insurance 
purchasers beyond these limited categories should be regarded as an open 
question. 
Contract design.  Apart from contract provisions giving the insurer control 
over claims management and deductibles, auto liability insurance contracts do 
little to address moral hazard.  This makes sense.  Auto liability insurance seems 
quite unlikely to reduce whatever safety motivation drivers would otherwise have.  
Serious auto accidents pose nearly as much risk of death or injury to the insured 
driver as to others.  Fear of liability is unlikely to add much to the fear of pain and 
death that should accompany unsafe driving.  While auto insurance policies 
contain an exclusion for intentional harm, we doubt that eliminating that ex-
clusion would do much to increase intentional auto injuries because of the fear of 
police monitoring and any resulting criminal prosecution.76  Further, if the 
accident is unlikely to cause injury, it is also unlikely to cause significant loss.  The 
deductible for the driver’s first-party property damage coverage in the auto policy 
should control the moral hazard of insurance in these instances.  
As with D&O insurance, most people buy automobile liability insurance 
limits that are much less than the potential damages in a serious claim.77  Those 
limits seem quite unlikely to serve a moral hazard management function in the 
auto liability insurance context, however.  Research suggests that people are 
almost never required to pay their own money out of pocket (so-called blood 
money payments) in an auto liability claim, and when they do, the amount 
typically is a token payment.78  Of course, ordinary people are unlikely to un-
derstand this situation in any detail, but the absence of such cases means that they 
are very unlikely to hear about anyone suffering negative consequences from 
being underinsured.  Moreover, those rare individuals who are concerned about 
excess liability can take care of this concern by buying umbrella and excess auto 
liability insurance policies. 
Auto insurance deductibles do not apply to the liability coverage in an auto 
policy, perhaps because insurers do not want to do anything to discourage people 
from promptly reporting potential liability claims.  Thus, these deductibles cannot 
  
76. Cf. Tom Baker, Liability Insurance at the Tort-Crime Boundary, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS 
CULTURAL PRACTICE 66 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009); Tom Baker et al., 
The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004) 
(reporting experimental research showing that increasing the probability of detection decreases the 
likelihood of violating a norm). 
77. See ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 101–02. 
78. See Baker, supra note 70. 
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serve a moral hazard management function, either.  The one auto insurance 
contract provision, apart from the claims management provisions, that may have 
some moral hazard management impact is the family-member exclusion.  This 
exclusion prevents suits between family members and is thought to reduce the 
likelihood of collusive lawsuits among family members similar to the insured versus 
insured exclusion in D&O insurance policies.79 
Claims management.  Except for auto insurance policies sold to large 
organizations with special self-insurance arrangements, automobile liability in-
surance policies assign the insurer complete control over defense and settlement 
of claims.  This means that auto liability insurers hire, fire, and direct the defense 
lawyers and decide whether and when to settle the claim, without any need to 
consult with the nominal defendant.80  Among other consequences, insurers’ 
control over claims management means that the real party in interest in automo-
bile liability claims is a massively repeat player managing the defense of any 
particular claim as just one in a portfolio of cases.81  This practical reality makes 
automobile liability insurers very important players in the civil justice arena and 
worth careful study for reasons that go well beyond the role of liability insurance 
as a regulator of drivers.82 
Loss prevention.  We have not found any examples of auto insurers providing 
tailored loss prevention services targeted to the specific situations of individual 
insureds.  What we find, instead, are generalized exhortations to employ safe 
driving practices, such as using seatbelts and child-safety seats and supervising 
teenagers while they learn how to drive.83  On the whole, auto insurers’ most 
significant loss prevention efforts appear to be directed at reducing the frequency 
  
79. See LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 114:24 (3d ed. 2005) 
(describing family member exclusions).  Couch reports, “The trend is to find that clauses expressly 
excluding coverage of relatives of the insured are void and unenforceable. . . . The reason for 
avoiding the clause is that it violates the statutory scheme of comprehensive liability coverage.”  Id. 
§ 114:25 (footnotes omitted). 
80. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 875 (reporting that insurer has discretion to settle 
without consent of insured). 
81. For some potentially negative consequences of that control for victims of auto accidents, see 
Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001), rev’d, 538 U.S. 
408 (2003), which describes one insurer’s claims management practices. 
82. See Yeazell, supra note 2, at 188–89 (illustrating that the centrality of insurance to liability makes 
insurance important to study in order to understand the civil justice system). 
83. See, e.g., How to Prevent Texting While Driving, ALLSTATE, http://www.allstate.com/tools-and-
resources/car-insurance/keep-teens-from-texting-behind-the-wheel.aspx (last visited July 2, 2013); 
Overcome Road Rage, PROGRESSIVE, http://www.progressive.com/shop/teen-driving-road-rage.aspx 
(last visited July 2, 2013); Welcome to the State Farm Teen Driver Safety Website, ST. FARM, http:// 
teendriving.statefarm.com (last visited July 2, 2013) [hereinafter Teen Driver Safety]. 
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and severity of auto accidents more generally, through research and education and 
engagement with public regulation, as discussed next. 
Research and education and engagement with public regulation.  Although we 
have not found a comprehensive source, it is clear the auto insurance industry is 
deeply involved in auto safety research and education and deeply involved with 
public regulation of auto safety.84  Auto insurers fund drivers’ education program-
ming and support public education efforts.85  In addition, the auto insurance 
industry lobbies for auto safety regulation at all relevant levels of government.86 
C. Gun Liability and Insurance 
Given how few gun injury claims are actually brought, there are many parts 
of the liability field that are much more important than gun liability.  Neverthe-
less, we discuss gun liability here for two reasons.  First, the Connecticut field 
research on liability insurance and the regulation of firearms represents an early 
attempt to analyze systematically liability insurance as a form of regulation.87  
Second, even more than shareholder liability, gun liability provides a cautionary 
example of some of the limits of regulation by liability insurance. 
Despite the widespread attention given to gun violence, there is very little 
civil liability arising out of that violence.88  One important reason is that liability 
insurance does not reach most gun-violence claims.89  Leaving aside the high-
profile mass shootings by troubled middle-class young men, the people who per-
petrate a large percentage of gun violence are unlikely to have homeowners or 
other general liability insurance.90  Even if they did, however, homeowners and other 
  
84. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 9, at 220–23. 
85. See, e.g., Parents of Teen Drivers, GEICO, http://www.geico.com/information/safety/auto/teendriving/ 
parents (last visited July 2, 2013); Start the Conversation—Teaching Your Teen to Drive—Talking to 
Other Parents, ALLSTATE (Mar. 15, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://blog.allstate.com/start-the-conversation-
teaching-your-teen-to-drive-talking-to-other-parents; Teen Driver Safety, supra note 83. 
86. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 9, at 223; see also Insurers Battle on Two Fronts to Force High Safety 
Standards on Mexican Truck Traffic, INS. ADVOC., July 21, 2001, at 18; NAII Praises Enactment of 
Laws That Promote Driver Safety, INS. ADVOC., May 13, 2000, at 22. 
87. Baker & Farrish, supra note 29. 
88. Id. 
89. See Swedloff, supra note 36, at 739–41. 
90. Cf. id. at 751 & n.100 (“Most criminal defendants have few collectable assets.”).  In some rare cases, 
victims or their survivors have sued under some form of a negligent supervision theory to attempt to 
collect from insurance proceeds.  See Michael Janofsky, $2.53 Million Deal Ends Some Columbine 
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/20/us/2.53-million-
deal-ends-some-columbine-lawsuits.html; Joel Berg, School Shootings Offer Grim Risk Management 
Reminder, RISK & INS. (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=533345910 
(“After the Columbine massacre, victims’ families reached a $1.6 million settlement with parents of 
the two gunmen.  Payouts were made under the parents’ homeowners policies, according to news 
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general liability insurance policies exclude coverage for intentional injuries.91  Without 
liability insurance and with few other collectable assets, there is little reason to 
bring lawsuits against perpetrators of gun violence.  As a result, gun liability, like 
domestic violence torts, is one of those “remote islands of tort liability that 
lawyers and law professors know about, but almost no one goes to visit.”92 
Risk-based pricing.  Homeowners and other general liability insurance com-
panies do not charge different prices to people based on gun ownership or use, 
except when selling commercial policies to gun-related businesses, such as 
sporting goods stores and gun clubs.93  Apparently, lawsuits arising out of acci-
dental gun injuries are sufficiently rare in other contexts that insurers do not 
consider that risk in pricing. 
Underwriting.  Although homeowners insurers ask about gun ownership in 
the course of their underwriting, they do not ask that question for purposes of 
liability underwriting.  Rather, they ask to evaluate whether the applicant needs a 
special rider to cover the theft or damage of a valuable gun.94  Insurers selling com-
mercial insurance policies to gun retailers do consider loss prevention during their 
underwriting, but they are more concerned with safeguarding guns and weapons 
from theft or other property damage than with reducing liability risks.95  For 
policies sold to gunsmiths, the underwriting is directed primarily at risk of 
injuries to workers rather than to customers or others.96  For policies sold to gun 
clubs, the focus in underwriting is on reducing accidental injuries to members and 
guests, and it is possible that some clubs may at the margin decide not to engage 
in riskier activities (such as tree stands and shooting from horses) or decide to 
adopt and post safety procedures as a result of learning about the risks in the 
underwriting process.  All of these concerns lie some distance from the gun 
violence that is the subject of so much attention today. 
  
reports.  A separate settlement of about $900,000 was struck with two men alleged to have supplied 
weapons used in the shooting.”).  Rather than suggest a significant overlap between liability for gun 
violence and liability for insurance, these lawsuits should demonstrate the difficulty of recovering in 
most gun violence cases.  Here, the victims had to sue the parents of the shooters and two men who 
supplied the shooters with guns to obtain anything of value. 
91. See Baker, supra note 76, at 70; Swedloff, supra note 36, at 751. 
92. Baker, supra note 3, at 7; see also Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121 (2001).  
93. Baker & Farrish, supra note 29, at 301–05. 
94. Id. at 299. 
95. Id. at 301–02. 
96. See id. at 303–04.  Of note, an authoritative underwriting manual indicates that sporting goods 
stores pose greater liability risk than gunsmiths.  This is consistent with the researchers’ conclusion 
that gun liability risks do not loom large among liability insurance underwriters (since the big 
liability risks for sporting goods stores have little or nothing to do with guns).  Id. 
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Contract design.  For liability arising out of gun violence, the most important 
feature of liability insurance policies is the intentional harm exclusion and, in 
recent years, a broader version of that exclusion in many homeowners insurance 
policies, which excludes coverage for claims arising out of criminal activities even 
if the injuries were accidental.97  Because of these exclusions, liability insurers 
rarely have any financial responsibility to the victims of gun violence.98 
Claims management.  Because gun violence claims usually are excluded 
(except when a parent or employer is sued for failure to supervise), there is little 
occasion for liability insurers to be involved in the management of any civil claims 
arising out of gun violence.  If the claim were to be crafted in a manner that 
obligated the insurer to provide a defense, that defense almost certainly would be 
subject to conflict of interest rules that prohibit the insurer from controlling the 
defense.99 
Loss prevention.  With the exception of liability insurance for gun clubs, 
insurers apparently do not engage in loss prevention efforts directed at gun 
liability.  This makes sense because they have few covered losses to prevent.100  As 
the gun liability situation highlights, insurers are unlikely to do anything to 
prevent losses that insurance coverage generally excludes.  
Research and education and engagement with public regulation.  Not sur-
prisingly, the Connecticut research concluded that the liability insurance industry 
was not engaged in research and education or in public regulation of gun liability 
risks.101  While insurers might have some reason to do so for gun clubs, that is a 
small market and the clubs apparently look to other sources for their primary loss 
prevention advice.  With regard to public regulation of guns and gun violence, 
insurers likely conclude that, because they have little at stake, the public relations 
risks exceed any potential benefits and, thus, they stay on the sidelines.102 
  
97. Id. at 299. 
98. Id.; cf. Peter H. Schuck, Why Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won’t Work, in SUING THE GUN 
INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS, supra 
note 29, at 225, 249 (“[T]ort litigation is a remarkably indirect, indiscriminate, crude, and 
unpromising remedy for the plague of gun-related violence.”). 
99. The insurer will reserve the right to refuse to pay the claim because of the intentional injury or the 
criminal act exclusion, thereby becoming obligated to hire independent counsel.  See generally Baker, 
supra note 39. 
100. Baker & Farrish, supra note 29, at 312–13 (drawing a comparison between the current absence of 
such activities and what could occur if “gun violence [could be brought] under the liability 
insurance umbrella”). 
101. Id. 
102. See id. at 299 (reporting negative publicity for an insurer seen to be as “anti-gun”). 
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D. Medical Professional Liability and Insurance 
The extensive empirical research on medical malpractice has not system-
atically explored the regulatory role of medical malpractice insurance.  Never-
theless, there is a substantial volume of quantitative research, some field research 
on personal injury claims that included medical malpractice liability, and mixed-
methods research on hospital risk management.103 
As an initial matter, the research suggests that, similar to the situation for 
automobile liability, insurance is the asset that matters for claims brought against 
individual doctors.  While doctors would seem to possess sufficient assets to make 
them viable defendants even in the absence of liability insurance and to enable 
them to pay amounts in excess of their insurance, the available evidence strongly 
suggests that, as a practical matter, the liability of individual doctors is capped at 
their policy limits.104  That is, doctors rarely have to pay out of their own pockets 
to settle malpractice claims.  Perhaps as a result, some doctors underinsure rela-
tive to the potential damages in a significant claim.105  There are press reports 
suggesting that insurance is just as important in lawsuits against hospitals (and, 
interestingly, that some thinly capitalized hospitals intentionally underinsure in 
order to drive harder settlement bargains with plaintiffs), but there has been no 
systematic research on this topic.106 
Risk-based pricing.  The general understanding is that these insurers and 
most of their commercial insurance competition price their insurance policies 
exclusively based on the type and location of each doctor’s practice, without tak-
ing into account individual doctors’ experience or loss prevention activity.107  We 
understand that insurers use experience rating and consider loss prevention 
  
103. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 70 (qualitative research including medical malpractice claims); Bernard 
Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988–2002, 2 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2005) (presenting the original study by the team using the Texas 
Department of Insurance closed claim database); Schwartz, supra note 42 (reporting results of 
interview and survey research on how hospital risk managers use information from medical 
malpractice claims). 
104. See Baker, supra note 70, at 314; Kathryn Zeiler et al., Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice 
Payments: Evidence From Texas Closed Claims, 1990–2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S9, S20–S23 (2007). 
105. Zeiler et al., supra note 104, at S34; see also Baker, supra note 70, at 297. 
106. Anemona Hartocollis, Troubled New York Hospitals Forgo Coverage for Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/nyregion/some-hospitals-in-new-york-lack-
a-malpractice-safety-net.html.  In the case study reported in BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES (1998), 
the hospital had a $17 million policy, and the insurer controlled the defense and settlement.  The 
first author has reviewed on a confidential basis a liability insurance program issued to a major 
hospital with per claim limits in excess of eighty million dollars. 
107. Gary M. Fournier & Melayne Morgan McInnes, The Case for Experience Rating in Medical 
Malpractice Insurance: An Empirical Evaluation, 68 J. RISK & INS. 255 (2001). 
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efforts when selling professional liability insurance policies to larger group prac-
tices and hospitals, but once again, we have been unable to find any systematic 
research on this topic.108  Our sense is that risk-based pricing is unlikely to regu-
late individual doctors to any significant extent (with the potential exception of 
discouraging physicians from either delivering babies or conducting surgery on a 
part-time basis),109 but risk-based pricing may affect loss prevention behavior in 
larger medical organizations. 
Underwriting.  We have been unable to find any evidence that the medical 
liability insurance underwriting process provides loss prevention information to 
solo or small group practices.  We have received reports of insurers conducting 
loss prevention–focused underwriting inspections of hospitals and large group 
practices, and we understand that some insurers have medical personnel on their 
staff for this purpose, but once again, we have not found systematic research on 
this topic.  As with risk-based pricing, our sense is that medical professional lia-
bility underwriting does not do much to affect loss prevention by individual 
doctors, but it may affect the loss prevention efforts of larger medical organi-
zations. 
Contract design.  Medical professional liability insurance policies contain 
three types of moral hazard control provisions: deductibles, exclusions for kinds 
of claims that pose a high degree of moral hazard, and claims management 
provisions.  Our sense is that the deductibles are too small to have a significant 
impact on individual and small group practices, but that hospitals and other large 
organizations may have deductibles that are comparable to those in D&O 
insurance policies.  We have seen five kinds of exclusions that could be understood 
to address moral hazard: (1) an expected or intended exclusion that is similar to 
that present in general liability insurance policies, (2) an exclusion for criminal 
acts, (3) an exclusion for liability “arising from the willful violation of any stature 
or ordinance,” (4) an exclusion for sexual misconduct, and (4) an exclusion for 
claims brought by one insured against another in policies issued to groups.110 
  
108. See MICHELLE M. MELLO, SYNTHESIS PROJECT, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
INSURANCE: A PRIMER 1 (2006), available at http://www.rwjf.org/pr/product.jsp?id=15091 
(reporting that hospital liability insurance is experience-rated). 
109. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 153–55 (2005) (making the point that 
another explanation for the decline of obstetrical work by family physicians is competition from 
obstetrical specialists). 
110. Cf. David M. Lang, Sexual Malpractice and Professional Liability: Some Things They Don’t Teach in 
Medical School—A Critical Examination of the Formative Case Law, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 151, 159–60 
(1999) (listing exclusions in insurance policies used to deny coverage for claims involving sexual 
misconduct); NORCAL MUTUAL INS. CO., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY 
(2005), http://www.norcalmutual.com/coverages/NORCAL_Individual_Policy_Specimen.pdf  
(making available for inspection a sample medical malpractice liability policy with no expected or 
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We are skeptical that eliminating these exclusions would in fact increase the 
frequency or severity of the presently excluded activity (except, perhaps, for the in-
sured versus insured exclusion).  There are other mechanisms to prevent doctors 
from intentionally harming or criminally abusing their patients such as social 
norms and fear of criminal punishment.  To the extent these other pressures do 
not control the behavior, it is unlikely that a fear of civil liability would prevent 
doctors from committing these excluded acts.  Thus, we doubt that these contract 
provisions in fact regulate medical practice.  What the provisions are quite likely 
to regulate, however, is tort litigation, by encouraging plaintiffs to shape their 
claims to avoid the application of these exclusions.111 
Claims management.  Like auto liability policies, medical malpractice in-
surance policies for doctors typically give the insurer complete control over the 
defense and settlement of the claim.112  In the past, many medical malpractice 
policies contained provisions that required the insurer to obtain the doctor’s 
consent before settling; some policies still contain those provisions.113  We expect 
that policies issued to large health systems, like liability policies issued to other 
large organizations with substantial deductibles, grant substantial control over the 
claims to the organizations, while giving the insurer the right to object to settle-
ments that exceed the deductible.  We have not, however, found research that 
addresses this question. 
Loss prevention.  While we have found no systematic research on the role of 
medical liability insurers in loss prevention,114 some insurers report that they do 
provide loss prevention services, for example by providing courses that satisfy 
doctors’ continuing medical education requirements.115  We understand that 
CRICO, the captive insurance company organized by the Harvard hospitals, has 
an active loss prevention business “created in 1998 to extend [the] patient safety 
mission beyond the Harvard-affiliated organizations through broad dissem-
ination of products and services designed to reduce medical error and malpractice 
exposure.”116  Since CRICO provides insurance only to the Harvard-affiliated 
  
intended exclusion); Doctors’ Professional Liability Insurance Policy #1 (on file with first author) 
(limiting the application of the willful violation exclusion only when the statute or ordinance 
imposes criminal penalties; no insured versus insured exclusion). 
111. See Baker, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
112. See, e.g., NORCAL MUTUAL INS. CO., supra note 110. 
113. See, e.g., Doctors’ Professional Liability Insurance Policy #1, supra note 110. 
114. Cf. Schlanger, supra note 42 (reporting on the use of claims information by a hospital system). 
115. See, e.g., Knowledge Center, DOCTORS CO., http://www.thedoctors.com/KnowledgeCenter/index. 
htm (last visited July 2, 2013). 
116. See CRICO, http://www.rmf.harvard.edu/About-CRICO (last visited July 2, 2013); see also 
Schwartz, supra note 42, at 51 (describing the CRICO strategies work and reporting that CRICO 
now has closed claim files for thirty percent of the medical malpractice cases in the United States). 
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organizations, however, the loss prevention services it provides to other hospitals 
are, by definition, not packaged with insurance and thus not “bonded” in the 
sense discussed earlier.  Some other insurers report that they provide loss pre-
vention services to their own insureds.117 
Research and education.  Medical liability insurers were slow to pick up the 
patient safety mantle, preferring in early years to focus their efforts on limiting 
liability for their members rather than on protecting patients.118  There were some 
exceptions, however,119 and in recent years medical liability insurers have been 
more involved in such efforts.120 
Engagement with public regulation.  Historically, medical malpractice insurers’ 
primary engagement with public regulation has been supporting legislative efforts 
to make it more difficult for patients to bring medical malpractice claims, to place 
caps on medical malpractice damages, and to enact other tort reforms (such as the 
elimination of joint and several liability and the repeal of the collateral source rule) 
that are believed to reduce medical liability exposure.121  We have been unable to 
find any reports of medical malpractice insurers engaging with public regulation 
to promote patient safety in a manner that is analogous to the automobile insur-
ance industry.  Our speculation is that this focus on limiting liability rather than 
promoting patient safety results from medical liability insurers’ historically close 
identification with the medical profession and from the insurers’ perception that 
doctors would prefer to buy insurance from insurers that are seen as fighting to 
preserve doctors’ autonomy rather than seen as telling doctors how to practice 
medicine.  Moreover, expenditures to reduce liability may offer better return on 
investment.  Because of the low rate of medical malpractice claims to medical 
malpractice injuries, investments in medical malpractice prevention do not lead 
to corresponding reductions in malpractice claims.122 
  
117. See, e.g., Customized Risk Management Capabilities, MED. PROTECTIVE, http://www.medpro. 
com/risk-management-offerings (last visited July 2, 2013) (listing risk management services); 
Education and CME, DOCTORS CO., http://www.thedoctors.com/KnowledgeCenter/Patient 
Safety/CME/index.htm (last visited July 2, 2013) (listing educational services). 
118. Some medical liability insurers continue to focus substantial attention on limiting liability.  For 
example, The Doctor’s Company website emphasizes the historic role of that company in 
promoting tort reform.  Our Story: Founded by Doctors, for Doctors, DOCTORS CO., http://www.the 
doctors.com/TDC/CON_ID_004332 (last visited July 2, 2013) (describing the origin of the 
company in the mid-1970s insurance crisis). 
119. Much of the closed claim file research on medical malpractice was only possible because of the 
cooperation of medical liability insurers.  See BAKER, supra note 109, at 94–95. 
120. See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 22–23. 
121. See generally WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, 
MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004). 
122. See Michelle M. Mello et al., Who Pays for Medical Errors? An Analysis of Adverse Event Costs, the 
Medical Liability System, and Incentives for Patient Safety Improvement, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
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III. LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE 
In the previous Part, we looked at the ways in which insurance regulates 
insureds in several different contexts.  In this Part, we turn our attention to the 
role of insurance in the lives of lawyers.  
Malpractice insurance is increasingly a fact of life for lawyers.  One state 
requires insurance for all practicing lawyers,123 several states mandate insurance 
for lawyers who practice as part of limited liability entities,124 and nearly half the 
states encourage liability insurance by requiring that firms disclose whether they 
have coverage or not.125  Beyond these requirements, liability insurance may be a 
business reality for a profession that has seen an expansion in the number and 
severity of malpractice claims over the past four decades.126 
Although there has been much less research on legal malpractice than on 
medical malpractice, there is more prior writing on the potential regulatory impact 
of legal malpractice (or LPL) insurance.127  We begin our analysis of that potential 
impact by organizing what can be discerned from the prior literature into the 
categories we used for the other kinds of liability insurance above.  We then 
compare LPL insurance with the other kinds of insurance and conclude by 
raising some questions about the degree to which this LPL insurance regulation 
may be resisted or transformed. 
Two caveats are in order before the categorization.  First, although we are 
early in our research, it is already clear that the LPL market is not monolithic.  
  
STUD. 835, 835 (2007) (noting that hospitals only bear 22 percent of the costs of hospital injuries 
and that “[l]egal reforms or market interventions may be required to address this externalization of 
injury costs”); Michelle M. Mello & David Hemenway, Medical Malpractice as an Epidemiological 
Problem, 59 SOC. SCI. & MED. 39, 39 (2004) (“[B]ecause malpractice claiming is a rare event with 
many false positives, for the average hospital or group practice, even substantial improvements in 
rates of negligent injury will not lead to a large reduction in claims rates.”). 
123. Oregon requires “both that lawyers be insured and that the basic coverage be with the Professional Liability 
Fund, a state entity.”  5 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 36:1, at 
3–4 (2010); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 752.035 (2011). 
124. See 5 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 123, § 36:1, at 6 (“A common requirement [imposed by state 
statute] is for specified, minimum insurance limits in exchange for practicing in a limited liability 
entity, such as a corporation, limited liability corporation or limited liability partnership.”). 
125. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROT., STATE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF ABA MODEL COURT RULE ON INSURANCE DISCLOSURE (2011), http://www.americanbar. 
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/chart_implementation_of_mcrid
_080911.pdf. 
126. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 307–09 (laying out changes in law and regulation of lawyers that led to 
more malpractice claims); Fischer, supra note 11, at 63–64 (citing empirical studies about the 
market penetration of LPL insurance); Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession’s Dirty 
Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1661 (1994) (“Since 1970 there has been an unprecedented 
growth in legal malpractice claims and lawsuits.”). 
127. See sources cited supra note 11. 
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Insurers segment the market based on firm size.  As a result, there are at least 
three distinct markets within the universe of LPL insurance (while recognizing 
that different insurers draw the line between those segments in different ways): 
(1) solo and very small firms, (2) firms of up to 35–50 lawyers or so, and (3) larger 
firms.  Some insurers will not write insurance for small firms and solo practi-
tioners.128  Smaller firms are likely to be market-takers, in that they are forced to 
accept the contract terms without any negotiation.  They are, in the parlance of 
LPL insurance, part of a program.  There may be more room for negotiation 
between insurers and medium-sized and larger firms.  Thus, there may be more 
contract variability.  Additionally, there may be differences in the amount of risk 
management services provided and the uptake of these services in these different 
markets.  These differences are due to both the legal firms’ characteristics apart 
from size, and because of the liability insurers’ organizational forms or business 
approaches. 
Second, there is an important distinction to be made between what the 
insurer hopes to achieve from risk management (beyond branding and market-
ing) and the effects of the risk management on law firms.  Insurers do not en-
courage risk management to change lawyer behavior to enhance client experience, 
ennoble the legal profession, or promote another end of intrinsic interest to 
lawyers.129  Rather, insurers encourage changes in behavior to serve the insurer’s 
own interests, which at this point we take to be reducing payouts and maximizing 
profits.  For example, insurers design contracts to maximize the attractiveness of 
the coverage at the most profitable rate.  They may write exclusions into contracts 
because the risk occurs too frequently or with too great a severity to be covered by 
premiums that insureds are willing to pay, because insurers cannot control the risk’s 
moral hazard, or because the risk is correlated with other risks making the ex-
cluded risk too expensive to cover in the aggregate.130  To the extent that law 
firms respond to insurers’ bottom-line-driven motives, that effect may have little 
or nothing to do with the insurers’ motives.  For present purposes we care mostly 
about effects, not motives, and we do not want to be misread as confusing the two. 
  
128. There is some debate about what constitutes a “small firm.”  For purposes of this Article, it is 
enough to say that while different insurers think differently about what it means to be small, 
midsize, large, and international, most insurers seem to do some sort of segmentation based on size. 
129. See generally Silver, supra note 11, at 234–35. 
130. With respect to this last item, an insurer operating in North Carolina, for example, may not be able 
to adequately diversify a property insurance portfolio if a significant number of the homes insured 
are all on the Outer Banks, because any hurricane is likely to create a loss for all of the homes.  That 
is, the risk of any one loss is correlated with a significant number of other losses at the same time.  
Thus, the insurer may choose not to sell homeowners insurance in North Carolina at all. 
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A. Regulation by LPL Insurers 
The prior writing suggests that LPL insurers use many of the tools described 
above—risk-based pricing, underwriting, contract design, loss prevention services, 
and research and education—and those tools can affect the practice of law. 
Pricing.  Our strong sense is that LPL insurers engage in risk-based pricing, 
taking into account such factors as firm size, practice areas, and geography, as well 
as the claim history of a firm.131  As we move deeper into the research, we will be 
able to say more about these kinds of risk-based pricing, though it already is clear 
that there is substantial variation among insurers.  For example, the largest mutual 
insurer—Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society (ALAS)—charges a flat rate for 
a given policy size based simply on the number of lawyers in the firm.132  In 
addition to these more easily quantified aspects of law firm risk, insurers could 
base their pricing, in part, on certain governance structures in the law firm.  For 
example, there are reports in the literature that some LPL insurers take into 
account such things as whether firms have 
• a leadership team with an eye toward risk management and authority to 
implement change as needed; 
• a general counsel who oversees risk management, acts as a lightening rod 
for problems that may arise in a firm, and develops a plan for training all 
new lawyers at the firm; 
• good centralized procedures for client intake and conflicts checks; 
• management of the way the time is recorded, entered, and billed; 
• significant financial controls; and 
• a policy, procedure, and culture to deal with inevitable mistakes.133 
Our research will investigate whether, when, and why insurers consider such 
governance factors. 
Underwriting.  It still remains to be determined whether and how the 
underwriting impacts the governance of law firms.  Our research will investigate 
the underwriting process, including types of information passed between insurers 
and law firms and what loss prevention activities LPL insurers take into account 
  
131. See RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE: LAW OFFICE GUIDE TO PURCHASING 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE § 4.8, at 28–29 (2012). 
132. See, e.g., ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT] (laying out the per attorney premium rates based on 
size of policy and retention regardless of the risk profile of the insured). 
133. See, e.g., Davis, Complementary Visions, supra note 11, at 103–07. 
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in underwriting for purposes other than determining the price of insurance.  
Insurers could refuse to sell insurance to law firms that fail to meet their standards 
along any of the dimensions listed in the pricing paragraph above or for other 
reasons that we have not yet learned about.  For example, the ALAS annual 
reports indicate that it has refused to renew certain law firms and that it has not 
accepted the applications of others.134  Our research will subject these kinds of 
practices to more systematic review. 
Contract Design.  LPL insurers include a number of contract features that 
may have the effect of reducing moral hazard.  Many of these provisions are simi-
lar to contract provisions designed to control moral hazard in other liability 
insurance contexts.  First, limits and deductibles are likely to be important ele-
ments of moral hazard management, though we predict that their effect varies 
among firms.  For example, different sized firms with different organizational 
structures might respond differently to different limits or deductibles.  Further, 
like liability policies in other arenas, most LPL policies contain a provision that 
excludes coverage for intentional, fraudulent, or criminal acts.135  Once again, the 
practical effect of these provisions seems likely to vary among firms. 
Additionally, LPL insurance contracts include a number of provisions 
specific to the practice of law.  These provisions disclaim coverage for certain 
activities, which may affect a law firm’s incentives to engage in those activities or 
to allow its lawyers to do so.  Some law firms may even set up procedures de-
signed to place checks on such activities to avoid the possibility of bearing the risk 
alone.136  Three sets of examples follow. 
First, many LPL policies exclude coverage for claims that arise from work 
lawyers do that is not directly related to the practice of law.  This is true even if 
such work may be good for generating business for the law firm.  For example, 
policies routinely exclude coverage for claims arising out of one of their insureds’ 
• service as a director or an officer for entities other than the law firm 
itself;137 
  
134. See 2011 ALAS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 132, at 22–24 (“Since 1992, by recommendation of the 
Preferred Risk Committee, ALAS, Inc. has declined to renew 20 firms, including 11 since 2000.”). 
135. See, e.g., LPL Policy 3, at Exclusion A; LPL Policy 1, at Exclusion 5; LPL Policy 2, at Exclusion 
5; see also 5 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 123, § 36:22, at 135 (noting that LPL policies ex-
clude coverage for “‘moral’ risks, such as fraud, intentional, malicious and criminal conduct that no 
insurer intends to cover”).  (Note that the authors have been given access to the LPL Policies cited 
in this Article on the condition that they be kept confidential.)   
136. It is also possible that policy definitions and exclusions limiting coverage have a different impact: 
Insureds will simply seek coverage from another source. 
137. See, e.g., LPL Policy 2, at Exclusion 3; LPL Policy 1, at Exclusion 3; LPL Policy 4, at Exclusion II.7.a. 
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• promotion, sale, or solicitation of the sale of securities, real estate, or 
other investments;138 or 
• work in or ownership of a separate business.139 
Exclusions in this category make sense from an insurer’s perspective as the ex-
cluded services raise risks the insurer did not necessarily intend to cover in an 
LPL policy.  The additional services may raise additional liability or create risks 
that the insurer does not believe it can appropriately price or bundle in an LPL 
policy.  Our concern is less about the reasons for the exclusion than with the 
effects on the insureds.  In this case, given that lawyers cannot as easily transfer 
the risk of liability for these activities, lawyers may be less likely to participate. 
Second, as Anthony Davis notes, LPL insurers may also try to control cer-
tain strategic decisions of lawyers or firms.140  Insurers may try to limit coverage 
related to informal networks of lawyers who share space or advertising and regu-
larly include provisions related to insureds hiring lawyers laterally, merging with 
other firms, or using temporary lawyers (lawyers hired on a contract basis, who 
are not associated with the firm).  For example, insurers may 
• exclude coverage for vicarious liabilities that arise from the wrongful acts 
of attorneys with whom the insured shares office space, marketing ma-
terials, and so on;141 
• exclude coverage for lawyers who are being sued for work that they 
performed before joining the insured;142 and 
• limit the coverage of temporary attorneys only for claims arising out of 
“work done within the scope of their employment” for the insured.143  
This provision may limit coverage if claims arise out of “activities of the 
temporary lawyer unrelated to the matter(s) for which the temporary 
lawyer was hired; claims from undisclosed conflicts introduced by the 
temporary lawyers; and claims arising from difficulties in supervision and 
overseeing the activities of such temporary lawyers.”144 
As with the exclusions in the first category, these provisions may make sense from 
the insurer’s perspective.  Activities like hiring new lawyers—even, or especially, 
  
138. LPL Policy 4, at Exclusion II.9.a. 
139. See, e.g., LPL Policy 1, at Exclusion 8. 
140. Davis, Regulators, supra note 11, at 216–18 (discussing coverage of lawyers who were hired laterally 
or who joined the insured firm through a merger). 
141. Id. at 215. 
142. Id. at 216. 
143. Id. at 218. 
144. Id. 
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on a temporary basis—can introduce risks that were not present at the origination 
of the contract.  Regardless of the motives, these provisions mean that firms cannot 
easily transfer the risk associated with mergers, acquisitions, lateral hiring, and 
temporary hiring to insurers.  As such, the effect may be that firms are more 
circumspect about engaging in these activities. 
Third, again from Anthony Davis, LPL insurers may view certain trans-
actions as particularly likely to generate malpractice claims, even if such transac-
tions are not explicitly prohibited by rules of professional conduct.145  Thus, for 
example, insurers could exclude from coverage any 
• representation “where the lawyer or firm has personal, entrepreneurial or 
business interests in a client’s business or affairs”;146 
• representation “involving conflicts of interest among multiple clients”;147 or 
• claims arising out of claims brought by a law firm against a client for fees. 
Even though lawyers may be allowed to represent clients with conflicts of 
interest or to enter into transactions with clients under certain circumstances 
(such as with clients’ consent),148 insurers view these representations and trans-
actions as very risky.149  When representations or transactions go poorly, clients 
have a built-in claim for malpractice.  Likewise, while suits against clients are not 
prohibited, they may be likely to generate malpractice counterclaims.  It is easy to 
see why insurers would therefore exclude these kinds of behaviors from coverage.  
And it is easy to see why lawyers may choose to forgo these kinds of represen-
tations, transactions, and suits for fear of facing future liability without sufficient 
insurance. 
Claims Management.  At this point in our research it appears that there is 
some variability in the control that insurers exert over claims management.  Some 
LPL policies promise to pay for defense costs but permit the insured to choose 
their own defense counsel and to direct their own defense.150  Other policies are 
more traditional duty to defend policies in that the insurer chooses defense coun-
  
145. Id. at 213. 
146. Id. at 212; see also LPL Policy 3, pt. V.E, V.H. 
147. Davis, Regulators, supra note 11, at 213. 
148. Under most rules of professional responsibility, these transactions are allowed under certain 
circumstances.  For example, under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers may repre-
sent conflicted clients if the lawyers obtain consent of both parties.  To enter into business trans-
actions with clients, lawyers need to obtain written consent, make sure the transaction is fair and 
reasonable, and give the client the opportunity to seek independent counsel.  See MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2012). 
149. Davis, Regulators, supra note 11, at 212–13. 
150. See LPL Policy 1, pt. IV.5.d; LPL Policy 2, pt. IV.5.d. 
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sel and more directly controls the defense.151  Under either type of policy, insurers 
likely exert some control with regard to settlement negotiations.  A significant 
part of our ongoing research will be to understand more about which firms 
negotiate to have more significant control over their own defense, why they do so, 
and how this term affects claims management. 
Loss Prevention Services.  As with contract design, insurers could encourage 
specific behavior through different types of loss prevention services.  There are a 
number of loss prevention services that could be offered to law firms.  Insurers 
could offer educational services to firms in the form of seminars, continuing legal 
education (CLE) credits, or newsletters, focusing on firm management issues like 
client intake, conflicts, and time and file controls that are prime generators of 
malpractice claims.  These materials and programs could set out best practices, 
provide cautionary tales, or both.  Insurers could create a hotline for firms to call 
when they have an issue emerging.  More intrusively, insurers could audit a firm’s 
management systems and require changes consistent with the audit findings.  
Once again, there are reports in the literature that some insurers do provide such 
services.152  The Holy Grail for an LPL insurer is a law firm with “internally 
generated and effective peer review and practice oversight,” because these prac-
tices demonstrate that the firm takes seriously the job of managing its own risky 
behavior.153  What insurers try to do to achieve that, and what lawyers think 
about their efforts, will be a significant focus of our research. 
Research and Education and Engagement with Public Regulators.  Insurer-
provided continuing legal education appears to be a significant aspect of the CLE 
landscape in some jurisdictions.154  In addition, the National Association of Bar 
Related Insurance Companies (NABRICO) insurers have been cooperating 
since the 1980s with the American Bar Association on collecting legal malprac-
tice claims information.155  We have not found public sources reporting other 
  
151. See LPL Policy 3, pt. VI.B.; LPL Policy 4, pt. I.C.1. 
152. Davis, Complementary Visions, supra note 11, at 112; Davis, Regulators, supra note 11, at 220–21.  
153. Davis, Regulators, supra note 11, at 221. 
154. See, e.g., FLA. LAW. MUTUAL INS. CO., http://flmic.com/newsletter.cfm (last visited July 2, 2013) 
(providing free, on demand CLE courses); LAW.’S MUTUAL INS. CO., http://www.lmic.com (last 
visited July 2, 2013) (making CLE courses available to members under tab labeled “CLE 
Department”); Nabrico, LAW.’S MUTUAL, http://www.lawyersmutualnc.com/nabrico (last visited 
July 2, 2013) (listing CLE courses under tab labeled “CLE”). 
155. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., CHARACTERISTICS 
OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL MALPRACTICE DATA 
CENTER (1989); AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE 
OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 2008–2011 (2012); see also NABRICO, http://www.nabrico. 
org (last visited July 2, 2013). 
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engagement with research and education or engagement with public regulators.  
This is yet another subject for our continuing research. 
B. Comparing LPL Insurance With Other Forms of Liability Insurance 
The table that follows summarizes our overview of regulation by liability 
insurance across the five fields of liability that we have explored, recognizing that 
the information included in many of the cells has not been well documented and 
that our research on LPL insurance has just begun. 
 
TABLE 1.  Regulation by Liability Insurance Comparison Table 
 Shareholder Auto Guns 
Medical 
Malpractice
Lawyers 
Professional 
Overlap of 
liability and 
insurance 
Substantial, 
except for the 
biggest claims
Practically 
complete 
Very limited 
Substantial; 
some 
underinsurance
Substantial; 
small firms 
may go bare 
Risk-based 
pricing 
Individualized; 
some experi-
ments with 
formulas 
Big data 
None, 
except for 
gun-related 
organizations
Scheduled for 
small; 
otherwise 
individualized
Varies from 
per capita to 
formulas to 
individualized 
Loss prevention 
underwriting 
Some None 
Only for 
gun-related 
organizations
None for 
small; some 
for large
Varies from 
limited to 
extensive 
Contracts 
address moral 
hazard? 
Yes 
Minimal 
(family 
member)
Yes: 
deregulation 
by exclusion
Yes, but more 
for large 
organizations
Yes 
Insurer control 
over claims 
management 
Shared Complete 
Complete 
for accidents; 
none for 
intentional
Complete for 
small; shared 
for large 
Varies 
Loss prevention 
services 
Minimal Limited None 
Varies from 
none to some 
Varies from 
limited to 
extensive 
Research and 
education 
Minimal Extensive None 
Some; maybe 
increasing
Substantial 
Engagement 
with public 
regulation 
Minimal Extensive None 
Some; but 
largely to limit 
liability
Unknown 
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Gun liability is the outlier.  The primary governance activity is negative.  
Liability insurance contracts exclude the kinds of civil liability that might lead 
insurers to be motivated to do something about gun violence.  Gun liability thus 
provides a useful, cautionary example of the limits of regulation by liability in-
surance.  We cannot expect insurers to regulate risks that produce liabilities that 
usually are excluded from their insurance contracts.156 
Although auto liability appears nearly as different from LPL as gun liability, 
we expect that, at least for solo and very small firm practitioners, auto and LPL 
insurance may have more in common than the table suggests.  In both cases, the 
relatively small size of individual premiums prevents insurers from individ-
ualizing underwriting or loss prevention.  Instead, insurers employ a cookie-
cutter approach.  Important differences include the efficiencies made possible by 
the auto market’s sheer size and the massive amount of data the insurers are able 
to collect, the lesser penetration of LPL insurance into the market, and the 
importance of lawyers’ professional organizations, which may reduce the room 
for regulation by insurers. 
Medical malpractice presents an interesting contrast to LPL.  Medical 
providers likely segment for liability insurance purposes into small, medium, and 
large organizations, like law firms.  And medical providers have professional or-
ganizations that act on and for them.  Yet LPL insurance appears to be both more 
and less regulatory than medical malpractice insurance.  On the one hand, lawyers 
are less likely to be insured and, we believe at this early stage in the research, less 
likely to cede claims management control to insurers when they are insured.  On 
the other hand, LPL insurers are reported to be more likely to be involved in loss 
prevention and more likely to engage in research and education directed at reduc-
ing the extent of the underlying harm (as opposed to reducing liability without 
regard to harm). 
As with auto liability, shareholder liability may prove to have more in 
common with LPL than the table suggests, at least for very large law firms.  It 
seems likely that the liability faced by these firms has more in common with that 
of their public company clients than the liabilities of lawyers in solo and small 
  
156. If suits against parents or other secondary defendants, like the ones related to Columbine, increase 
in prevalence, there may be increased pressure in the insurance industry to participate in the 
regulatory conversation.  See sources cited supra note 90.  That said, this seems unlikely given that 
these mass attacks, while salient and memorable, likely do not represent a significant portion of the 
injuries or deaths related to gun violence. 
Regulation by Liability Insurance 1447 
 
 
firm practice.  If so, the LPL insurance for these firms may be more similar to 
public company D&O insurance than to small firm LPL insurance.  If, despite 
those similarities, insurers play a more active role in the regulation of these law 
firms than in public companies, as some prior research suggests,157 much can be 
gained from exploring why.  Is it because lawyers are also owners of their law 
firms, because law firms care more about their reputation, because risk manage-
ment is somehow more effective in law firms than public companies, or because 
of some other reason that has not yet occurred to us? 
C. Effectiveness of Regulation by Liability Insurers 
There is little doubt that LPL insurers could have some impact on the way 
their insureds practice law.  What is less clear is how much or what kind of impact 
insurers really have.  Lawyers may reject, ignore, or try to rationalize their way 
around risk management advice.  Risk managers may for other reasons fail to 
instill a culture of risk management in firms.  Moreover, law firms, especially 
large law firms, may already be so saturated with risk management advice that 
there is little room for governance from insurers.  These are among the subjects of 
our ongoing research. 
Lawyers and law firms may resist adopting insurers’ risk management 
measures, perhaps because of cultural barriers within the practice of law, the 
structure of law firm management and compensation, or lawyers’ preference for 
autonomy.  Some scholars have suggested that there will be a significant clash 
between lawyers’ vision of themselves as independent actors and a need to cen-
tralize control to minimize risks.  The claim is that historically lawyers have oper-
ated autonomously and largely unsupervised within a law firm—individual lawyers, 
teams on a specific matter, or units of a firm operating as individual fiefdoms 
resistant to top-down risk management.158  This resistance to risk management 
may be exacerbated if the tools used by risk managers are presented as an 
instrumental set of rules.159  As Milton Regan explains, given their self-image as 
autonomous actors, lawyers may be “sensitive to what they perceive as intrusive 
monitoring—perhaps quicker to construe supervision as excessive and to be more 
  
157. See Alfieri, supra note 11; Davis, Regulators, supra note 11. 
158. See ANTHONY E. DAVIS, RISK MANAGEMENT: SURVIVAL TOOLS FOR LAW FIRMS 5 (1995) 
(referring to this as the cottage-industry model of law firms); Regan, supra note 11, at 1958 
(“[L]awyers have sought to maintain their personal independence, notwithstanding the economic 
realities driving their collective activities.”). 
159. Regan, supra note 11, at 1966 (“Rules, whether narrowly or broadly phrased, will not impose meaningful 
constraints on lawyers who do not have underlying commitment to moral force of the law.”). 
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resistant to it.”160  Further, given their training, lawyers “are adept at creative 
interpretation of rules and at fashioning plausible arguments in support of their 
interpretations.  This may enable them . . . to convince themselves that they are 
not violating a given rule, thus reducing any psychological dissonance that they 
might feel by engaging in certain behavior.”161 
This concern is redoubled in light of the common eat-what-you-kill com-
pensation model.162  Under this model, firms compensate lawyers based on the 
business they bring to the firm.  As such, lawyers who generate business, so-called 
rainmakers, are prized possessions of firms and are potentially above the struc-
tures of risk management.  Conversely, this model incentivizes lawyers who do 
not generate significant business to take on riskier clients or matters—those who 
may be conflicted with other clients or those who may not have the ability to 
pay—that, in turn, could lead to more malpractice claims. 
It is also possible that law firms are already so saturated with risk manage-
ment advice that insurers have little effect even on law firms that are ready, 
willing, and able to implement insurers’ risk management measures.  Large law 
firms especially are likely to have adopted already the easier risk management 
techniques, such as creating a general counsel and employing a sophisticated con-
flicts management process.  If this is true, there may be little room for additional 
or enhanced supervision from insurers. 
Finally, the literature on the legal profession has raised enough questions 
about the ethical implications of the risk management approach promoted by 
liability and insurance that we need to consider whether LPL insurance gover-
nance should be resisted on these grounds.  The concern is that a risk management 
approach could undermine other regulatory controls, including ethical regulation 
by codes of professional liability and independent, ethical decisionmaking by 
individual lawyers.163  The leading proponent of this concern, Anthony Alfieri, 
argues, “the technology of risk assessment and regulation . . . subtly discounts the 
daily necessity of moral discretion and the constant calling of public obligation.  As 
a result, lawyers and law firms underestimate the burdens of moral agency in the 
discretionary decisionmaking of advocacy and counseling.”164 
  
160. Id. at 1972. 
161. Id.  Regan argues that risk management will work better when the firms are able to instill a culture 
that reinforces ethical behavior—a culture that values ethical behavior not for instrumental reasons 
but for its own sake.  Id. at 1967. 
162. See generally MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET 
LAWYER (2007). 
163. Alfieri, supra note 11. 
164. Id. at 1910–11 (footnote omitted). 
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In this view, the rise of risk management techniques presents a number of 
dangers.  First, risk management diminishes the “lawyer’s individual responsibility 
for making moral choices,” because ethical decisionmaking (such as whether a 
conflict exists) is centralized to a firm bureaucratic structure like a general counsel 
or conflicts committee.165  Second, when risk management is treated as a set of 
rules, rather than as part of the aspirational tradition of legal professionalism,166 
lawyers will further abdicate their role as ethical decisionmakers by viewing risk 
management as an obstacle to get around, rather than as a set of structures that 
encourages ethical behavior.167  Third, risk management structures may allow 
lawyers to be willfully blind to their own, or other’s, unethical behavior.168 
Importantly, all of these concerns come against a backdrop of big changes in 
the legal profession.  As law firms have become bigger and more bottom-line-
driven, pressure has mounted for firms and individual lawyers to generate more rev-
enue for the firm.  These pressures—the competition among firms and attorneys—
may play a significant part in changes in the norms of practice.169 
What is missing is an on-the-ground, empirical account of the role that these 
concurrent trends actually play in governance of law firms.  Is it true that ethical 
behavior has changed in law firms and, if so, does that change lie at the foot of 
risk management, the increasing commercialization of the practice of law, or 
some other unknown force?  Alternatively, is it possible that risk management is 
enhancing ethical behaviors within firms?  Is risk management creating ad-
ditional deep governance at the firms? 
Our research may help disentangle this complex set of questions.  While our 
research likely will not uncover the root causes of any such changes, we may be 
able to see better what role lawyers’ liability and lawyers liability insurance com-
panies have, if any, in creating a culture of risk management and what such a 
culture means in practice. 
  
165. Id. at 1939 (emphasis omitted). 
166. Id.; see also Regan, supra note 11, at 1960 (discussing the aspirational tradition). 
167. See supra notes 159–161 and accompanying text (discussing Regan’s article). 
168. Anthony V. Alfieri, Big Law and Risk Management: Case Studies of Litigation, Deals, and Diversity, 
24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 991, 1003–08 (2011). 
169. Alfieri, in particular, harkens to long-gone yesteryear of practice when “law firm culture” imbued 
lawyers with “ideals of fraternity and community,” and classical norms of lawyering “defined lawyer 
character and conduct in terms of wisdom, prudence, and craft-like virtuosity” and “cultivated the 
values of [law] firm loyalty and institutional consensus.”  Alfieri, supra note 11, at 1926.  Alfieri cites 
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (4th prtg. 1995), Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: 
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983), and selected works from Thomas Shaffer for 
the norms he ascribes to lawyers.  Alfieri, supra note 11, at 1927. 
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CONCLUSION: INTO THE FIELD 
In this Article we have laid out a simple framework for analyzing how 
liability insurance can serve as a form of regulation.  Using information from prior 
research, we applied that framework to five kinds of liability: shareholder, auto, 
gun, medical malpractice, and legal malpractice.  Based on this analysis, there is 
good reason to believe that liability insurers, and the kind of risk management 
thinking that liability insurance promotes, may have a significant effect on law 
practice, as others suggested well before we became interested in LPL insurance.  
Nevertheless, legal scholarship has a long way to go in order to develop a system-
atic, thorough understanding of those effects and their variation across types of 
practice and organizational forms. 
For that, we need to go into the field, interviewing and observing LPL 
personnel (underwriters, brokers, actuaries, loss prevention specialists, claims pro-
fessionals), a cross section of lawyers working in different kinds of organizations 
and locations, risk management consultants, the lawyers who bring and who 
defend legal malpractice claims, the people active in lawyers professional 
associations who work on liability and insurance matters, and no doubt other 
categories of people we will learn about in the research.  This is an enormous proj-
ect, but one that has the potential to improve substantially our understanding of 
how liability and insurance affect law practice and the legal profession.  Legal 
academics have devoted a great deal of energy in recent years to studying medical 
malpractice and shareholder liability.  It is good for us to focus some of our research 
efforts closer to home. 
